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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
RAYMOND S. SHUEY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14818 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
The City of Salt Lake is appealing an adverse 
Order of the District Court of the Third Judicial Dsitrict 
in and for Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court found for the defendant and 
held that the presumption rule upon which the City of 
Salt Lake relied in its conviction of the defendant was 
invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-respondent herein named was con-
victed in Salt Lake City Court for violating the Salt Lake 
City Revised Ordinance, Section 156. The defendant appealed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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said conviction in the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County. Said appeal was 
taken on stipulated facts, reserving to the Court a 
determination of the issue of law regarding the use of 
the alleged common-law presumption rule by the City. 
The rule of presumption, as used by the City 
of Salt Lake, is that a registered owner of an automobile 
is presumed to have parked said automobile, and further, 
that said presumption constitutes prima facie evidence 
that the person in whose name such vehicle is registered 
as owner, committed or authorized the commission of such 
violation. A similar presumption was previously codified 
as Salt Lake City Revised Ordinance, §46-8-170, and, in 
1973, was repealed. 
The District Court reversed the decision of the 
City Court, found the defendant not guilty as charged, and 
held that the City of Salt Lake had no legal power to 
employ a common-law rule of presumption in the determination 
of defendant's guilt. 
Prior to April of 1973, the City of Salt Lake 
enacted an ordinance enabling the City to use as prima 
facie evidence the presumption that the registered owner 
of a vehicle committed or authorized the commission of a 
parking violation. Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances, 
§46-8-170. In 1952, the Utah Court held that the power 
to pass an ordinance establishing a rule of evidence 
-2-
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tn 
· n the courts is not granted to cities expressly binding o 
bY statute and is not fairly implicable from or incident 
to powers expressly given cities. Nasf'ell v. Ogden, 
122 utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952). See also Walton v. 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939); 
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 
(1933); and, Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 
p.234 (1923). 
Subsequently, in 1973, the City of Salt Lake 
repealed the offending portion of the ordinance which 
authorized the use of the presumption rule, but since the 
repeal, has been using a common-law presumption which 
closely parallels the repealed ordinance. 
Although the Nasfell decision explicitly 
addressed itself to the validity of a codified presumption 
rule, by negative implication it also addressed itself to 
the issue of the existence of a similar common-law 
presumption rule. Inasmuch as the Nasfell court made 
no mention of a common-law presumption, it chose to give 
no legal vitality and no judicial recognition to a common-
law presumption. Hence, the Nasfell decision held, albeit 
implicitly, that there was no common-law presumption rule 
which us under attack in the case at bar. 
Even if the court finds that Nasfell, supra, 
is not controlling and that there is in existence a common-
law presumption rule, the rule is invalid. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
IN UTAH, THERE IS NO VALID COMMON-LAW PRESUMPTION 
THAT THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WAS IN CONTROL 
OF THE VEHICLE AT THE TIME IT WAS ILLEGALLY PARKED BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO RATIONAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FACTS PROVED 
AND THE ULTIMATE FACT PRESUMED. 
ARGUMENT 
The judiciary cannot assert the existence of a 
common-law presumption if there is no rational connection 
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. 
"A presumption upon a matter of fact, when it 
is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means 
that common experience shows the fact to be so generally 
true that courts may notice the truth." Greer v. united 
States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918). More recently, the United 
States Supreme Court in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 
(1943), laid out a test to apply when considering the 
validity of a presumption. That is, there must be a 
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate 
fact presumed. 
"If the inference of the one from proof 
is arbitrary because of lack of connection 
between the two in common experience" the 
presumption cannot be sustained. ~· 
supra at 466. 
The plaintiff-appellant's brief relies on statistics 
taken nearly 40 years ago in a Michigan poll which evidence 
-4-
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that in only 4.4% of all parking violations, "the violation 
was committed by some person other than the owner or an 
immediate member of his family." See pg. 5 of the Brief 
of the Appellant. In other words, in all but 4.4% of the 
violations, the registered owner or a member of his family 
committed the violation. Although the appellant does not 
expressly conclude that a presumption is valid which holds 
the registered owner liable for misdeeds committed by 
relatives, the inference is there. To infer that the 
registered owner of an automobile is responsible for the 
conduct of a relative who illegally parks a car is totally 
spurious and such an inference denies the registered owner 
due process of law. There is already in existence a statute 
on the subject of criminal responsibility for the conduct 
of another and it reads as follows: 
Criminal responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or for conduct of 
another.--Every person, acting with the 
mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes 
an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. Utah Code Ann., 
§76-2-202, as amended, 1973. 
The above statute explicitly requires intent to commit or 
intent that another commit the conduct constituting the 
offense. The City of Salt Lake, by applying the common-
law presumption, infers that a registered owner has the 
requisite mens rea. This inference is false and as such, 
-5-
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invalidates the presumption which rests upon the false 
inference. 
The presumption also lacks effect as applied to 
corporations. First, the corporation has no feet, cannot 
drive, is unable to park, but can be the registered owner 
of a vehicle. Second, there is already in existence a 
statute governing the criminal culpability of a corporation 
and it reads as follows: 
Criminal responsibility of corporation 
or association.--(1) A corporation or 
association is guilty of an offense when: 
(a) The conduct constituting the offense 
consists of an omission to discharge a specific 
duty of affirmative performance imposed on 
corporations or associations by law; or 
(b) The conduct constituting the 
offense is authorized, solicited, requested, 
commanded, or undertaken, performed, or 
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors 
or by a high managerial agent acting within 
the scope of his employment and in behalf of 
the corporation or association. Utah Code 
Ann., §76-2-204, as amended, 1973. 
Sub-paragraph (a) of the above statute does not apply to 
the case at bar. Sub-paragraph (b) does apply and requires 
intent to commit or intent that another commit the conduct 
constituting the offense. Once again, the City's use of 
the presumption rule rests upon a false inference that 
automobile registration carries with it an assumption of 
legal and criminal responsibility for the misconduct of 
others. The inference is, once again, spurious and as 
the inference falls, so must the presumption rule fall. 
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A corollary to the Tot test is that the presumption 
must be more than a regulation of order of proof based 
upon the relative accessibility of evidence to prosecution 
and defense. 
"Nor can the fact that the defendant 
has the better means of information, standing 
alone, justify the creation of a presumption. 
In every criminal case, the defendant has at 
least an equal familiarity with the facts and 
in most a greater familiarity with them than 
the prosecutor. It might, therefore, be 
argued that to place upon all defendants in 
criminal cases the burden of going forward 
with the evidence would be proper. But the 
argument proves too much. If it were sound, 
the [Court] might validly [find] that mere 
proof of the identity of the accused should 
create a presumption of the existence of all 
the facts essential to guilt. This is not 
permissible." McFarland v. American Sugar 
Mfg. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86. 
The City of Salt Lake is predicating guilt of 
a parking violation on the mere identity of the registered 
owner of the automobile. For the City to create such a 
presumption based on the accessibility of evidence to 
the defendant is impermissible. 
Moreover, using the presumption rule to ease the 
prosecutor's burden of proof is an arbitrary use of the 
presumption and often has been described as "first aid" 
to the prosecutor. See Chamberlain, Presumptions as 
First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287. 
"Once the thumbscrew and the 
[resulting] confession made conviction 
easy; but that method was crude and, I 
suppose, now would be declared unlawful 
on some ground. Hereafter, presumption 
-7-
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is to lighten the burden of the prosecutor 
The victim will be spared the trouble of · 
confessing and will go to his cell without 
mutilation or disquieting outcry." Casey 
v. U.S., 276 U.S. 413, 420 (dissenting--=-
opinion). 
More importantly, the Supreme Court of the United 
States made it crystal clear that rationality is only the 
first hurdle which a presumption must clear. A rational 
presumption cannot be used to convict a man of a crime if 
its effect is to deny him the protection of a constitutional 
right. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219. An accused has 
a constitutional right to not testify against himself pursuant 
to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and pursuant to Article 1, Section 12, of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
The City Ordinance forces the defendant to come 
forward and explain why, in his case, the presumption should 
not be applied. This clearly subjects the defendant to an 
impermissible compulsion to testify. If the defendant 
refuses to testify, the City uses the defendant's silence 
as an acknowledgement of guilt. 
Using a defendant's silence as evide~ce 
against him is one way of having him testify 
against himself. Scott v. California, 364 
U.S. 471, 472. 
Hence, using the silence of a defendant as 
evidence against him violates the Fifth Amendment. "It 
Courts that the defendant's ' has long been the rule in Federal 
-R-
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failure to testify ought not to be even the subject of 
unfavorable comment, "United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 
63 at 72, 73, (J. Douglas dissenting opinion} (1965} 
let alone a tacit admission of guilt. 
CONCLUSION 
Nasfell, supra, controls the resolution of the 
appeal and the presumption rule should be given no legal 
vitality and no judicial recognition. 
In a criminal case, use of a presumption which 
is premised upon an inference of the requisite mens rea 
is invalid. Even supposing the Court could find that the 
presumption rule is valid, it can not be prima facie evidence 
of guilt because it lacks proof beyond~reasonable doubt of 
intent to commit the crime. The City would ask the Court 
to extract a criminal violation from mere automobile 
registration. This is a ludicrous inference and the City 
should be precluded from using this presumption rule. 
Furthermore, implementing a presumption rule to 
ease the prosecutor's burden of proof and forcing the 
defendant to rebut the presumption because he has a greater 
familiarity with the facts cannot be tolerated in a criminal 
case. 
Finally, even a rational presumption must succumb 
to a valid assertion of a constitutionally protected right. 
If the effect of a presumption is to deny a defendant 
his Fifth Amendment right to not testify against himself, 
~en the presumption must fall. 
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For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant-
respondent asks this Court to affirm the decision of the 
lower court and to invalidate the use by the appellant of 
the conunon-law presumption as evidence establishing guilt 
in parking violations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. Gilbert Athay 
-10-
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